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SATELUTES AND POmCS: 
WFATHER, COMMUNICATIONS, AND EARTH RESOURCES 
Since its founding in 1958, the National Aeronautics and Space Ad- 
ministration (NASA) has concentratai its effort in developing practical 
uscs for spaceflight, or space applications, in three programs: weather, 
communications, and Earth resources satcllites. Weather satcllites and 
communications satellites have been tested and improved so that they 
have now reached the stage of routine or cpcrationd use, but Earth 
resources satellites are still cxperimcnd. 
With applications satellites, NASA had to solve an extra problem 
not present in most other space projects: thcsc satellites were developed 
<?r users outside of NASA. W. Henry Lunbright, among others, has 
pointed out that conflict often a r k  when the agency developing a new 
technology is not responsible to the agency that will actually use it. The 
history of the three applications satellite programs shows different kinds 
of problems that can arise from this situation depending on the relative 
power of the various players, .:ie divergence of their interests, and uses to 
which the satcliites can be put. 
For weather satellites, problems between NASA and the user agency 
arose only when the program was nearly mJy to make the transition to an 
operational system. This was true not because of effective cooperation 
with the user, the Weather Bureau, but because of lack of coordination. 
Weather satellites use a television-type camera LO take pictures of 
cloud cover and then radio the pictures to Earth. Two types of weather 
satellites are now uxd: low alt~tudc satellites, which rapidly orbit the 
Earth taking pictures of various arcas, and geosynchronous satcllites, 
which orbit at such an altitude that they always remain over the same 
point of the Earth's surface and therefore provide continuous monitoring 
of the weather on one half of the globe. Communication technology has 
beer, improved so that the satellites now continuously broadcast the 
tclcvision pictures they take. These pictures can be received and used by 
anyone with an inexpensive antenna and printer. The first weather 
satcllita proved immediately useful for tracking hurricanes and other 
large-scde features difficult to observe as a whole from the ground. The 
benefits to routine weather forecasting irave been limited, howc~er, by 
the lack of a model of the aunosphcre exact enough to provide coknpletely 
accurate predictions even from plentiful data. 
Research on the possibility of using satellites to monitor weather started 
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as a military project. Thc project was tnosferrcd to NASA in 1959, under 
Rcsidm; Eiscnhowcr's commitment to put as much of the space program 
as poss~ble in civilian hands. The Weather B u s u  had littk voice in 
NASA's program; NASA fonncd an interagency advisory committee, but 
it had link influence. When the fist weatha satcIlite. Tiros. was 
hunch& in !%O. NASA vkcd the Weather Bumu to d y t t  the data. 
MettoroIogim f i n d  the data very ustful. md within a f m  days the 
Wcathcr Burcau started making doud-cover maps from nttllitc dam and 
distribuuly t h m ~  to mcteofologisrs to aid in ma& mtinc fomas.  
NASA planncd to follow the crperimental Tiros project with a mom 
sophisticad series of p r o r o - o p m r d  s;lrcllita & Nimbus. l h c  
Wcathcr Bureau. however, found the Tlros data satdktory and was 
suspicious of the plans far Nimbus bnrusc it was very cxpcns~vc and 
might not be ready btforc the last Tiros satellite rnchcd the end cf its 
us&l Me. The Wathcr b u  did not wvlt to commit ioclf to an a- 
pensive satellite pmgnm which, once operational. would be paid for cn- 
tirely frm the Bureau's small budget. On Srptcm'bcr 27, 1%3. the 
Wcather Burcau officially notificd NASA thzt it was withdrawing fmm 
& Nimbus programs and the existing intcmgcncy agrermcnt, and pro- 
pwcd an interim opcmtiond satellite based on Tiros and a ncw agreement 
making NASA and the W&r Bumu equal partners. The Wcathcr 
Bumu, a wcak agcncy without much support from its parent institution. 
the Department of Commerce, could afford to m&c such a move only 
because it had found a backer. The Depuunen: of .f offered to 
cooperate with the Wcathcr Bumu and provide the necessary expcnise 
with space hardwarc if NASA rcfustd to m m  the Wcathcr Bumu's 
terms. Mnsc  was jcalous of NASA for taking ova projms from the 
military s p m  prognm and was concerned about thc possibility of a gap 
bccwecn *he Tiros and Nimbus prognms that would leave the military 
without storm-warning information it h d y  depended on. Faccd with 
losing the whole program, NASA ncgotiatcd a new agtcsment with the 
Wcathct Bureau for a Tim operational synem. 
in this case the political conflict grcw out of the divcrg~~xe of interests 
of the rcxvch agency and the user agency. NASA wanted to develop a 
second generation of satellites employing the mast sophisticated 
technology, while the Weather Bumu wanted to usc the simpler, less ex- 
pensive system already in hand and not yet firlly utilized. The Weather 
Bureau wanted one sort of .s;ltellitc and NASA wanted another, but in- 
stead of compromising, NASA simply ignored the Wcathcr Bureau. This 
namnlly resulted in trouble when the time came for the Weather Bureau 
to start planning to tzlrt over the system from NASA. The location of the 
m a r c h  function in the opcnting agency, the Weather Bumu, would 
havc slowed down the adnncc d new technology, but perhaps learning 
to use the old tcchnolagy better would havc bem (and wu) morc produc- 
tive. Rcscarch groups tend towards indcpcndmce, whether they are 
separate or located in opmting agcncics, and mcuchcts can m l y  sct 
that morc sophisticated technology is not n d y  more useful. 
In the case of communicatbns satcllita, the probkm of tmnsitior: 
from an cxpaimcntal to an opcratiod system was compounded by con- 
flict ovcr who would bc the o p t i o n a l  user. Thc communications in- 
duscry saw the possibility of large profits. and the Congress had to d d  
with tricky philosophical issues of public versus private control. 
Communications ntcllitts relay radio waves carrying tekphonc. 
television. and data signals from one point on Earth to another. NASA 
tested t h m  varieties. Passive satcllitcr. Wrc Echo, simply provide a rcflcc- 
civc surfacc for radio waves to bounce off. Echo is just a ghnt mylar 
bailoon. Active satellites. which come in two types. mcivc the signal from 
the ground, ampllfy it. and retransmit it to its destination. Low altitude 
rtivc satellites. like Relay and Tclscar. move rapidly relative to the surface 
of the h h .  This means that the antcnna on the ground must bc pointed 
to follow the satcllitc and a numbcr of satellites am needed so that one is 
always available above the horizon. Geosynchronous active satellites. like 
Syncom, am placed in such an orbit that they remain always over the same 
point on the Earth's surface. This mo;c distant orbit requires morc power- 
ful tmnsmittca m d  more sensitive receivers on the satellite and the 
ground, but the advantages of the fixed position arc more important. 
Almost all of the many operational rommun~cations atellites currently in 
use arc of this typc. 
NASA started out with a 1i:nited role in communications satellite 
research-first only passive =aitllitcs, then only low-Jtiiudc 
satellites-because c i a  division of responsibilities with the D c p m e n t  of 
Dcfenx. Unlike other applications programs, however, this typc of 
satcllite was c k d y  going to be profitable to private industry, which 
therefore xt the pace. American Tclc~hone and Telegraph (AT&T) and, 
on a smaller sc-ale, other companies spent their own funds on comlnunica- 
tions satellite resevch in hopes of getting lucrative contracts hter, or. in 
the case of AT&T, in h o p  of gaining a monopoly. AT&T developed its 
own low-altitude, actlve, experimental satellite, Tclstar, and requested 
that NASA launch it. This would have put AT&T in a strong position to 
launch the fast communication satellite system as a private vcnture. 
Bccaux of concerns about monopoly, diplomacy, and giving away 
the fruits of government research, private industry did not get the free 
rein it wanted. NASA insisted that a govcmmcnt-funded and 
govcmmcntconuolkd cxpcrimentll communications satellire, to be 
developed under a contract awarded by compctitivc biding (to Hughes 
Aircnft Co. ), be planned fm. NASA cnvisioncd chat h e r  its qmimcn- 
ul program. Relay. an opcntiocul communications satellite system would 
bc owned by private indusay. NASA launched AT&l's satellite in Juiy 
1%2 after awarding the contract for Relay . but bcforc its launch. Mean- 
while. the Congfesr fought over dctnils of the institutional arrangements 
for the o p t i o n a l  system. Thc Department of Sutc was con& over a 
private company controlling the U.S. shvc of an international com- 
munications system; tibeds did not want to uc govcmmmt m h  
givcn away foi private profit: conxrvltivcs wanted the govcmment out of 
a function that private industry could handk; and communications and 
wrospacc firms wanted as much of the control and p;ofits as possible. The 
cnd result wu COMSAT. a private mmpany with some board mcmbcn 
appointed by the. President, carefully defined federal juridktions. and 
broad ownership by communications and aerospace firms and the gcncd 
public. 
This political fight slowed thc development of the technology and 
altered its chmctcr. During thc political controversy, NASA pmccdcd 
with rtsclrch on a geosynchronous communications satellite. too ad- 
vanced for the private companies to risk on their own. The tcsn of this 
satcllitc. Syncnrns I and 11. Iwnchcd in February md July 1963, provcd 
very succcaful. k r  the fat operatiand communications satellite sptcm. 
COMSAT chose to develop nut the system of low altitude sarellitcs that 
AT&T and the other communications ctrmpanicj had planned on. but 
rather a much less expensive systcm of geosynchronous satellites. In this 
cuc, unlike that of metcorologkd satellites, the uxrs mcrc grateful -for 
the advanced technology that NASA had developed dcspitc their initill 
lack of interest. 
The transition from an expe:imcntal to an opcraticnd systcm of 
communications mcllita was disrupted by disagretmcnts more ovcr 
political philosophy than ovcr technology. Thc tcchnclogy was Iffected, 
however. when the politkal aqpmcnts provided extra time during which 
a new technology provcd to bc superior. AT&T had wanted to gain con- 
trol ovcr the systcm by king the fm to develop the technology. The 
company failed to get economic control or contracts for its technology as a 
whole, but tbc &on no doubt srrengthened its position in Cornsat and 
the component market. 
For Emh resources satellites, NASA had to deal with a wide variety of 
uxn, laving the goais of the program uncertain. Without a deu i d a  of 
who wintld usc the nteIlite for what. choiccs of t- mre 
c o n t r o d .  
Earth rcswrres n t c k  proride wide-&, rcpctitivc picnua of the 
surfoccofthtE;rrthfortksur~r]rudmOnit~drt#wcts.nKfirst 
LPrrdrcrt satellite was hunchd in 1972; tk sccond a d  third ur still func- 
tioning and arry two sensors: a kind of tekvision camera and a sunncr 
that provides more pmk cdor data. Thc satellite radios thc data to 
Eurh, whac it is printed on photographic fh or analyzed by a com- 
puter. Even at rhc pr&cnt cou# resolution of 63 to 100 mas. the 
nttllitc ndios dorm 15 million bits of data pcr second. Proctssing. stor- 
ing. and orurting infinmation from this flood ofdam have p r o d  to be 
the mst difficult tcchdogdcholkngeafthcprojm. T b c d a m k  
bccnuscd~Uy.?tkwonancxpmimmtaisak. todctcctLvgc 
f- associated with oil and minds. to measure thc utu 
planted in diflltrcnt aops (to hclp prcdirt huvtso). to monitor watcr 
distribution and snow cover to predict flooding, and to make maps of 
land use. Uscn include fcdcral. nre. and b d  government agencies and 
private firms. 
The i c d d  agcncics wcm thc only uxrs with a v o k  in the develop- 
ment of the fm satellite. NASA set up a pro- in 1964 to ha t iga te  
thc use of space vehick to study Earth rcsourcts and t d c r r c d  moncy to 
thc departments of the Interior and AgncuIturc to consider what use they 
could make of the data. 'lhc Dcpvtmcnt of thc Intcriof dcvcbpcd so 
much enthusiasm for thc idea that when NASA moved slowly in mating 
plans for an cxpcrirr.cntd satellite. Intcrior pushed the project along by 
announcing its own satellite program. An indcpcndcnt satcllite project 
was vetoed by the Prrsidcni bccaux experimental satellites werc NASA's 
domain, but NASA spccdcd up its project. The Department cf 
Agriculture propad  a difcerat sensor from that daircd by Interior. 
Each agency pushed for a small. simpk satellite with the xnsor that 
would make the satellite most uxful to die agency. NASA conprc?miscd 
by flyijng both senson and choosing spectral ban& uxful for the widcst 
possibk mgc of applications. Some uxrs have complained that thcsc 
spcctrai bands make the data difftcult to use bccwx the) arc not optimal 
for any application. Comprorni;cs werc also made in the choice of orbit 
and NASA settled for two #nsoa instead of the more ehb~mte  cxperi- 
ment it had originally propad.  
To further complicate the situatim. NASA SIM realized that some 
of the greatat benefits from h d w t  would come from irnprovcd resource 
management on thc state and 1 4  level. NASA had dcvclopcd the 
satellite without consulting thcx uxn. and it proved diffiialt to persuade 
rhcm to usc thc new information. NASA set up a tcchndoCZy tnnsfer pro- 
gram for -, which muted mt just publicizing infcrnauion but has 
g r a d d y  dcvdopcd joint projms that ut c&ccnt in convincing stktrs to 
USC Lwkitdata. 'Iht states have been rehrtvlt to participate kausc  of 
dinrust of sophiskated mhodogy. vhich NASA as m agency scam to 
symbolize. and bCC?USt they did nor waot to make m invatmcnt -ti1 
tht~fognmhadsmkdintoafioaiopmtiolrulh.Beaunof~iack 
of immediate bcnefii and wick use lficr the 1972 hunch of the ftrn 
sarcllitt. the Offk of M l n y a c n t  and &Idget has oppod the uansi- 
tion O f h m h t f n w n  an crpaimmul projm into an opcntiod pro- 
gram. T!x commitment ro m opcntimd pragnm. to bc mulyd by thc 
N u d  O c d  and Atmosphcm Administration. was made only in 
htc 1979. 
In the case of Lardrot. NASA sucrcafully p h y d  thc uscrs off aginst  
mh other so that nont had coaml. but thc rr=ult was a projcct with a 
shortage of gods d support. Thc uxn NASA was most intcrcstd in. 
stltc and locd pvcmmcnts, had nor &cd for the projcct or shapcd the 
system into something uxful to thcm. k a m e  of this and thcir lack of 
cechnoiogical sophklc?tion. r h q  had lit& intcmt in adopting the ncn- 
cechniqucs NASA had dcvelopcd. Perhaps with morc involvement of tht 
users in tk dcsrgn and mow undcntudmng of th- df i i s im of ncw 
techniques. thc projcct would have bought morc benefits by now. In my 
ax, the politics of balancing the demanding agency uscn and the con- 
cept of future state and local wn forced NASA to ch- the most 
ncutd technology-useful to mryonc but i d 4  for no use. NASA pro- 
vided different techno& than individd users wanted in order to makc 
m e  satellite xrvc the whok range of uscn. The cornbinxion satellite is 
not compktcly s;rtisfmory. but thc Offkc of Management md h d g a  
would probably not have approved more than onc satellire. 
NASA has found the process of dcvekqing satellite programs for other 
agencies h u g h t  with controversy. The space agency has. probably 
unavoidably. M c d  &a its own inttrcsa in expanding its fcxvch pro 
gnm and punucd advancing technology without much sensitivity to thc 
n& of thc cvcntual usm. The probkm n a tricky ow. howcvcr. 
bccausc NASA can c h m  with some didi ty  that rhc uscn, b e a u s  chq 
uc riot technologically sophisticated, do not rcalizc the potential b c d m  
of ncw tcchnology Thc thm cvts of appii~rions ntcllitcr shim the uscn 
as scmctima grateful and sometima not for thc technology dtvcbpcd 
despite thcir wishes. The answer. 1 believe, I k  not in a h t c t  baiancr 
bcrwttn the wn' demands and NASA's ideu. but in tllcmg tht trcwbk 
to cducatc the users to puticipatc in the k l o p m c n t  of the technology. 
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